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ABSTRACT
China’s effectiveness in quickly solving the health crisis caused by
the coronavirus pandemic and in softening its economic impact
is rooted in the structural characteristics of its development
model, in which state-owned enterprises remain crucial. This
article holds that a strong public presence within the industrial
and banking sectors has provided Chinese government with the
opportunity to rapidly reactivate domestic production and,
potentially, to maximise the effectiveness of the recently
launched monetary and fiscal policy measures.
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This article will discuss how the extension of the public sector of Chinese economy has
allowed the country’s policymakers to limit the economic impact of COVID-19. In order
to understand the contribution provided by the state sector to counter what appears to be
the most serious crisis since 1929 (IMF [International Monetary Fund] 2020, v), it is
necessary first of all to examine the evolution of the events that have occurred in the
period between mid-January and the end of May 2020. This period coincides with the
explosion of, the control over and the reaction against COVID-19 in China. For exposure
convenience, this period is divided into three phases. Although they overlap to some
extent, this periodisation will help contextualise the working hypothesis. The suggested
idea is that the centrality occupied by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the Chinese
economy has equipped the country’s government with the resources necessary to signifi-
cantly reduce the time required to overcome the sanitary crisis (phase I), promptly reac-
tivate the domestic production chain (phase II), and maximize the effectiveness of fiscal
and monetary stimuli aimed at stabilizing the output (phase III).
During the first phase (end of January to mid-February 2020), the total or partial clo-
sure of the production facilities has hindered the circulation and the use of the factors on
which the production activity is based—such as labour, capital, and technology. This has
severely affected the key sector of the Chinese economy, namely manufacture. High tech-
nology sectors—such as the automotive and IT-electronics industries—have been the
most penalised, with profits falling by 79.6% and 87% respectively in the first trimester
of the year (NBS [National Bureau of Statistics of China] 2020a, 2020b). The cause of
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this dramatic decline lies in the high degree of social division of labor in their production
processes, so that production interruption in the areas most affected by the epidemic
immediately resulted in a bottleneck in the supply of components and semi-finished
goods—leading to a significant reduction in the volumes produced. The negative
shock on the supply side resulted in a fall in the aggregate demand. On one hand, the
fall of profitability, combined with the general climate of uncertainty, has slowed
down investments (NBS 2020a). On the other, restrictions on social contact and the
total or partial closure of the facilities, which has resulted in a generalised reduction of
hours worked (Xu, Dai, and Zhong 2020), have reduced the demand for consumer
goods. This downward spiral has led to an increase in the unemployment rate (from
5.3–6.2% between February 2019 and February 2020) and a decline in output of
−6.8%—the worst fall since 1962 in the aftermath of the “Great Leap Forward”’s disas-
trous experience.
Once solved the sanitary aspect of the crisis, the second phase of the Chinese battle
against coronavirus (mid-February—end of March 2020) coincides with the economic
response of the policy-makers, aimed at the quick re-establishment of the full production
capacity. The moderately expansionary policies adopted by the Chinese government at
this stage focus on restoring the financial condition of the micro, small and medium-
sized manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) severely affected by the epidemic. Given their
high degree of involvement in the production chain, the absorption of the losses accumu-
lated by these firms during the first “lockdown” phase and the channelling of liquidity
into the production system have contributed to a rapid reinforcement of the value
chain at the national level. At this stage, the limited redistributive interventions seem
to indicate that Chinese policymakers were relying on a rapid adjustment of the aggregate
demand to the new supply conditions. This is made clear by the words of Prime Minister
Li Keqiang, who, in mid-March 2020, stated that the recovery of China’s economy from
the “coronavirus crisis” was contingent upon the restoration of the “normal operation of
the market” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2020a).
The third phase (which began at the end of March and is still continuing) represents a
turning point in the Chinese government’s approach which is aimed at repositioning the
economy on a growth path. The global spread of COVID-19 has made clear that market
mechanisms alone would not be sufficient to restore the previous period’s income levels.
This is primarily due to China’s high degree of trade openness. Although the importance
of exports for the economy has been declining steadily since 2006, it still accounts for
17.4% of GDP (Figure 1).
The high elasticity of demand for Chinese goods with respect to their income implies
that the slowdown in advanced economies will have a significantly negative impact on
China’s export sector.1 In fact, the fall in incomes in Europe and the United States has
already begun to show its first effects if it is true that, despite that Chinese manufacture
began to fully recover its production capacity in mid-March 2020, exports have contin-
ued to decline in the following month.2 Given the relevance of exports for the domestic
economy, a long-term slowdown without reallocation of resources to other sectors could,
therefore, turn the pandemic’s short-term nature into a long-term recession. It is in this
context that fiscal and monetary measures have been recalibrated decisively on the side of
domestic demand.
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This article argues that the vigorous intervention of the state in the economic activity
plays a fundamental role in dealing effectively with the repercussions specific to each of
the three phases outlined above. Mere state interference in economic affairs alone, it must
be noticed, is far from enough to rapidly solve the crisis caused by the coronavirus pan-
demic and mitigate its economic impact. After all, “the government has an important
guiding role even in capitalist countries” (Solow 1962, 216), without them being capable
of achieving the same or at least comparable effectiveness against COVID-19 as China. A
major reason for this divergence lies in the different role of the state in capitalist econ-
omies compared with socialist ones. Under capitalism, the state stands as a guard of
the interests of capital accumulation, which essentially limits the role of the government
to solving market failures (for example through the provision of public goods that cannot
be provided by private organizations), indirectly managing aggregate demand, and even
implementing “a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment” (Keynes 1936,
378). This however, in no way implies extensive state property. Rather, it chiefly entails
the socialization of the costs and risks of investments, while the ownership of the means
of production and basic decisions concerning credit allocation remain firmly in the hands
of private enterprises, whose main goal is to maximize profit.3
On the other hand, “public ownership of the means of production is the basis of the
socialist economic system” (Yu 2018b, 70). The dominant role of public ownership is an
essential precondition for providing the government with the resources not only and not
so much necessary to maintain short-term equilibrium and address market failure (Yu
2018a), as “to coordinate the class relations between labor and capital in the stance of
the working class” (Cheng 2019, 520), a statement that does not apply in regard to the
government of capitalist countries. As the general representative of public ownership,
under socialism the state has therefore the potential to undertake critical socio-economic
responsibilities which, not infrequently, collide with the standard criteria of capitalist
profitability but which are nevertheless necessary to satisfy the common interests of
society as a whole.
Figure 1. Exports on China’s GDP and their destination in total (%). Source: NBS (2020a, 2020b, 2020c).
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In China, although the private sector has grown considerably, public ownership still
represents the pillar of the national economy. The main proposition of this article is
that the crucial position of state-owned enterprises, which belong to the people, has
endowed the leadership of the Communist Party of China with great leverage to “protect
people’s life and health at all costs” (phase I), influence the direction of social resources to
safeguard economic safety in the short-run (phase II), and implement development plans
that might possibly restore the economy on a growth path in the long-run (phase III). In
the initial phase, the relevance of an economic sector sheltered from competitive forces
has limited the conditioning exercised by market agents on the government sphere,
endowing the latter with the institutional capacity to promptly implement stringent lock-
down measures. Besides, the “structural production overcapacity” has allowed the public
enterprises to provide goods and services during the emergency context. Overall, this has
reduced the time needed to address the health crisis, decelerating the fall in income and
averting dangerous inflationary spirals. In the second phase, the direct connection
between the central bank and the public commercial banks that dominate the Chinese
financial system has sustained the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanisms,
channeling the resources necessary to safeguard the functioning of China’s industrial
chain to the SMEs. In the third phase, currently underway, government’s control over
state-owned enterprises might enable the recently launched monetary and fiscal stimuli
to result not only into a rapid increase in aggregate demand in the short term but also
into an acceleration of output growth potential in the long term.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the second part will outline the
structural characteristics of the Chinese economic model. In the three sections that form
the third part, working hypotheses will be elaborated. In the fourth, fifth and sixth part
the proposed assumptions will be tested, examining the role played by the state-owned
sector of the economy respectively in accelerating the resolution of the sanitary crisis
(Phase I), absorbing the shock on the supply side (Phase II), and effectively conveying
the expansionary manoeuvres recently launched by the government on the real economy
(Phase III). The final part concludes.
2. The “Structural Centrality” of SOEs in the Chinese Economy
Over the last few decades, the “opening-up” policies inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping have
offered private enterprises the opportunity to penetrate new sectors of the Chinese econ-
omy. The low wages guaranteed by a large labour surplus have given them the opportu-
nity to obtain high-profit margins, which have in turn driven a massive investment
process—resulting in an economic growth like no other at a global level (Aziz and Dun-
away 2007; Barnett and Brooks 2006; Ding, Knight, and Zhang 2019, 499; Gong and Lin
2008).4 Despite its growing importance, a limited number of private firms operate in the
capital-intensive industries, the latter being dominated by SOEs, which still “play a vital
role in China’s economic development” (Yu 2014, 165). In 2017, state owned enterprises
still held 48.1% of the stock of capital employed in industry (Figure 2)—a sector that
accounts for 40% of the GDP. The position of the state-owned enterprises is dominant
in the strategic areas, such as in the extractive and energy sectors, and their involvement
in high value-added productions such as cars and other means of transport is significant,
since they own 40.1 and 51.8% of the capital stock of the respective sectors. Even in the
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chemical industry, in the production of machinery and computer products, as well as in
the food industry, the presence of the State hardly seems negligible. Significant though it
may be, the specific weight of public enterprise compared to that of the private enter-
prises may be barely captured by these data, if it is true that, still in 2011, SOEs held
90% of the assets (and recorded 85% of the revenues) owned by the 500 largest companies
operating within national borders (Lu 2012).
The leading role of state-owned enterprises is intimately linked to the development
strategy typical of socialist countries and which the Chinese government still pursues
today—centred on maintaining full employment and simultaneously supporting metal-
lurgical, steel and mechanical industries. The pursuit of this double objective, however,
appears to be incoherent with the comparative advantages of the Chinese economy, so
that the capital-intensive nature of heavy industry makes it inherently incapable of
absorbing excess labour. For this reason, the surplus labour force is being occupied by
the State enterprises (Dong and Putterman 2003; Röller and Zhang 2005; Xu, Zhu,
and Lin 2005). In this sense, the redundancy of labour employed by SOEs serves political
objectives—first of all, the maintenance of social stability (Johansson et al. 2017; Lin, Cai,
and Li 1998; Perotti, Sun, and Zou 1999; Lin and Tan 1999; Lin and Li 2008, 92–93). Set-
ting this burden on SOEs pushes them to increase their output beyond the competitive
optimum, generating diseconomies of scale, which in turn result in efficiency losses (Xu,
Zhu, and Lin 2005). If the productive overcapacity is followed by an increase in pro-
duction, the effect is likely to be an increase in exports at low prices or a reduction in
marginal revenues. In both cases, the result is a fall in profitability (Figure 3). The profit-
ability figures for both the public and the private industrial sector seem to confirm this
assumption: from 2000 to 2017, the profitability of the former was almost three times
lower than that of the latter (6.4% compared to 19.2%), reflecting the divergence in pro-
ductivity between the two sectors (Du, Liu, and Zhou 2014; Yu 2014, 176).
The reduced availability of operating cash flows resulting from the low capital yields—
if not even from the constant losses recorded5—has not constituted a limit for the over-
Figure 2. Share of capital stock held by state-owned enterprises in China’s industrial sector (%).
Source: NBS (National Bureau of Statistics of China) (2020a, 2020b, 2020c).
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expansion of the SOEs’ production capacity. This is due to their special relationship with
the financial system, which continues to be firmly controlled by the government. The
country’s largest commercial banks are jointly regulated by the central bank (People’s
Bank of China [PBC]) and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CBIRC). In turn, these institutions depend directly on the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, hence the executive power. Unlike the “bancocentric” systems present
in advanced capitalist countries such as Germany and Japan, the Chinese peculiarity lies
in the ownership structure of the country’s credit institutions. Although the entry bar-
riers in the financial industry have been relaxed since the early 1990s, the Chinese
state maintains a far-reaching control over the credit sector (Figure 4). The four major
public banks in the country (the so-called “Big Four”) respond directly to the govern-
ment, and together hold 43.2% of banking assets (CBIRC 2014). Besides them, there
are twelve commercial banks quoted on the stock exchange, and a plurality of commer-
cial banks and cooperative banks that own 17.9%, 10% and 12.8% of the assets respect-
ively. In the first group, with the exception of two of them, the State (through the local
governments and the Big Four) represents the majority shareholder. The credit insti-
tutions belonging to the second and third group are also in the majority of cases con-
trolled by the public sector, as the local governments possess the majority shares of
the share capital (Lardy 2004, 99). Lastly, one final category of banking institutions
holds 16.1% of the assets. Within it, are the two public giants China Development
Bank and Postal Savings Bank of China, which together hold 9.7% of the total assets
(CBIRC 2014). It follows from what has been stated above that the state has the full own-
ership of 52.9% of the assets. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that the state
owns at least half of the remaining assets. This means that the government directly or
indirectly controls more than 75% of China’s banking assets.6
Even though competition among state-owned banks has intensified dramatically since
the early 2000s (Chong, Lu, and Ongena 2013, 3413–3414), the de facto monopolistic
position on the banking market as a whole has allowed the government to impose a
Figure 3. Profit rates of private and public enterprises in the industrial sector in China. Source: NBS
(National Bureau of Statistics of China) (2020a, 2020b, 2020c).
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high degree of “repression” within the financial sector. Through direct and indirect con-
trol over the banking system, the Chinese government was (and still is) able to set extre-
mely low interest rates on deposits and loans (Riedel, Jin, and Gao 2007). This has
produced (and continues to produce) two consequences: on one hand, in a context of
stringent control over capital movements, the maintenance of nominal interest rates
on deposits at similar levels of the inflation rate has provided the banking sector the
possibility of raising a large amount of resources at particularly unfavourable conditions
for the savers (Zhang and Tan 2015, 115). This, on the other hand, has enabled the bank-
ing system to offer loans to the corporate sector on extremely favourable terms. Decisions
on credit allocation, however, do not usually take place on the basis of criteria linked to
the financial performance of the production units. Rather, they respond to purely stra-
tegic considerations, which tend to support the development of heavy industry domi-
nated by SOEs, regardless of their profitability (Tan, Ji, and Huang 2016, 11). Within
this institutional structure, public banks serve as a transmission belt between the
socio-political objectives of the government and the productive expansion of SOEs by
guaranteeing favourable conditions of access to credit, and even the absorption of losses
(Firth, Lin, and Wong 2008; Lin and Li 2008, 95; Lindbeck 2007, 5).7 Moreover, the
accumulation of non-performing loans caused by the low profitability of SOE investment
projects is often resolved by direct government intervention, which has systematically
ensured the rescue of the public banks involved. The “soft budget constraint” (Kornai
Figure 4. Structure of the Chinese banking system. Source: Author’s elaboration of CBIRC data (CBIRC
2020a, 2020b).
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1986) they enjoy thus allows public enterprises to fulfil their “political obligation” by
means of a constant trend towards over-investment (Ding, Knight, and Zhang 2019,
504; Dollar and Wei 2007; He and Kyaw 2018; Liu and Siu 2012; Shen, Firth, and
Poon 2016).
3. The Resources Provided by the SOEs to Combat the COVID-19 Epidemic
In the following section, we will elaborate the assumptions concerning the resources pro-
vided by SOEs to Chinese policymakers, and which have enabled the latter to stem the
initial impact caused by the COVID-19 eruption (Phase I), reactivate the domestic supply
chain (Phase II), and maximize the effectiveness of expansive manoeuvres to support
aggregate demand (Phase III).
3.1. The Political and Economic Importance of SOEs and Chinese Economy’s
Resilience (Phase I)
The allocation of resources imposed by forces outside the market has contributed to
model an industrial structure that tends to favour objectives tied to high employment
levels. This has ensured, even during the Chinese market-opening phase, the survival
and eventually the expansion of SOEs, although they only rarely pursue profit maximisa-
tion objectives. The economic centrality of the public sector represents a specificity of the
Chinese model: with the exception of Japan and partially of the United States where,
however, public presence is largely overestimated due to the gigantic military apparatus,
in the most advanced European countries the “public” share in the total capital stock
amounts to two to three times less than in China (Figure 5).
The suggested hypothesis is that the greater influence in the ownership structure of the
domestic industry provides Chinese policy-makers the capacity to resist the interest
groups’ pressure, granting them a degree of independence from the exigencies of
Figure 5. Share of state-owned capital stock in China and selected OECD countries, 2016. Source: IMF
(2017, 2019, 2020).
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profit maximization required by the business system. In other words, the relevance of the
public sphere within the economy reveals a different weight of the influence of business
organizations on China’s political sphere than in the capitalistically advanced world. This
is even more significant if one looks at the property relations that prevail in the epicentre
area of the COVID-19 epidemic, i.e. the Hubei region, where the public sector’s share of
industry amounts to 57.1%. This could help explain the relative ease with which the Chi-
nese government has implemented blocking measures on manufacturing and transport
once the COVID-19’s deadliness was proven.
A second element inscribed in China’s economic structure that may have helped mini-
mize Coronavirus’s impact on the domestic economy lays in the structural production
overcapacity of the domestic industry, due to the constant trend towards over-invest-
ment of SOEs. While curbing efficiency and profitability (European Union Chamber
of Commerce in China 2016), preserving excess capacity can prove vital in modern econ-
omies that are increasingly dependent on complex systems. This because production sys-
tems and supply chains are vulnerable to a wide range of unintentional and unexpected
events, such as human error or environmental accidents. In other words, the minimiz-
ation of overcapacity ensures efficiency gains in the long term when production and
demand conditions are relatively stable. However, economic systems do not operate
within “controlled” laboratory conditions, but within natural environments, whose
inherent uncertainty precludes exact knowledge of future demand. For this reason,
“efficiency over the long run requires a certain degree of redundancy” (Perelman 2003,
140) capable of withstanding unforeseen events that may cause serious repercussions.
Logically, the outbreak of an epidemic is one such eventuality. In such circumstances,
excess production capacity favours the ability of the productive systems to maintain a
certain stability in the supply of goods and services (Fraccascia, Giannoccaro, and Albino
2018), conferring on both the individual firms and the production chains the abilities to
react promptly to external disturbances—absorbing the external shock and maintaining
their own functions.
Two implications follow: first, overcapacity equips SOEs better to face unexpected
events, enabling them to increase immediately supplies of goods whose demand has sud-
denly surged. Second, the greater the weight of public enterprises within the economy,
the greater is its resilience (ANBOUND 2020).
3.2. The Chinese Banking System and the Support for the Value Chain (Phase II)
As a result of market reforms, the Chinese banking system has sought to encourage the
expansion of SOEs in capital-intensive sectors (Tan, Ji, and Huang 2016, 2), creating what
some authors have described as a genuine “‘division of industry’ between private enter-
prises and SOEs” (Zhao 2009, 37). The relative penalization from the perspective of credit
allocation should not be interpreted as a lack of interest towards private enterprises,
especially the small and medium-sized ones. The latter continue to face serious difficul-
ties to obtain loans from banks, “because the Chinese banking system is still dominated
by large state-owned banks” (Zhao 2009, 44). Nevertheless, these firms occupy a key pos-
ition in the subcontracting of processed and semi-finished textile and chemical products,
ferrous materials, electrical wiring and retail. Their deep involvement in the national
(and international) value chain and their “labour-intensive” specialization not only
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make SMEs a vital part of the manufacturing sector, but also a significant vehicle of
labour absorption.
These firms are among the most affected by exogenous shocks because of their lack of
liquidity. The specialization in low-value-added processing and the high competitiveness
that characterizes the subcontracting chain hinders the accumulation of profits, thus the
slowdown of operations results in the erosion of their balance sheet—compromising
their capacity to meet their financial obligations.
Because of the high upstream involvement of these firms in the production chain, the
strengthening of SMEs financial condition is therefore an essential prerequisite for the
maintenance of the Chinese position in the manufacturing sector on the global scale.
It is possible to assume that, given its importance within the Chinese financial system,
the public-driven banking system possesses the capacity to promptly divert savings
towards the real economy, stabilizing SMEs’ cash flows, and thereby preventing a
chain of bankruptcies that would break the value chain at the national (and international)
level. The observation of the financial flows towards the real economy over the last twenty
years can provide some useful evidence to corroborate this hypothesis. An aggregate
measure of the liquidity provided by the financial system to the private sector of the
real economy over a given period of time is shown by a specific index of the Chinese stat-
istical system, designated as “aggregate financing to the real economy” (AFRE). The
financial system includes banking institutions, insurance companies, securities firms,
etc. The calculation of the AFRE therefore includes bank loans, foreign currency loans
and bonds (public and private), and equity capital that flow to the real sector of the econ-
omy through the financial sector (Elliott and Yan 2013, 9). Its correlation with gross
investment can approximate the contribution made by the financial system in supporting
capital accumulation. The Figure 6 below shows how this contribution has remained
average between 50% and 60% over the last twenty years. Nevertheless, the massive
flow of liquidity in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis, which reached almost 90%, indicates
Figure 6. The contribution of the financial system to the real economy. Source: NBS (2020a, 2020b,
2020c).
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a marked effectiveness of the financial system in diverting resources to the private
business system.
The incentive package adopted by the government in the autumn of 2008 was mainly
channelled through commercial banks, which “were encouraged to lend freely to stimu-
late investment” (Borst and Lardy 2015, 5). It can, therefore, be assumed that, as was the
case in 2009, the public nature of the Chinese banking system may contribute to allocate
the resources necessary to safeguard the existence of the SMEs severely affected by the
outbreak of the epidemic.
3.3. Industrial SOEs and the Transmission of Monetary Policy in China (Phase III)
The special relationship which intertwines the triad “political system—banking system—
industrial SOEs” substantially changes the transmission channel of monetary policy,
enabling it to “push on a string,” the metaphor used by Keynes to indicate how, while
a restrictive manoeuvre can easily lead the economy towards recession, an expansive
manoeuvre, on the contrary, may not be able to project the economic system in the direc-
tion of expansion. The reason is that, although the primary objective of monetary expan-
sion is to encourage firms to increase their investments, in a recessionary and highly
uncertain environment financial institutions often reduce the supply of credit towards
enterprises, especially to those less solid from a patrimonial point of view.
The existence of public enterprises can help solve this dilemma, at least over the short
term. On the one hand, thanks to the implicit or explicit guarantees given by the govern-
ment, the banking system can more easily allocate liquidity to public enterprises, which
are considered less risky from a lender’s perspective. On the other hand, central and local
government can intervene in SOEs’ operations, using them as vectors to support expan-
sive policies through the provision of loans to fund investment projects aimed at reab-
sorbing the workforce expelled from the labour market, as this typically happens in
the aftermath of a crisis. Because of these reasons, the relaxation of credit conditions
in a stagnant environment can go hand in hand with an increase in the level of indebt-
edness of public enterprises in comparison to private ones. This, in turn, may lead to a
higher rate of investment of the former over the latter (Chen, Li, and Tillmann 2019).
This means that the greater the weight of the public sector on the economy, the more
effective is the potential of an expansive “pushing on a string” manoeuvre, i.e. the accel-
eration of investment, employment and GDP. Since the public sector, as seen above,
occupies a substantial part of Chinese industry, it can also be assumed that expansionary
manoeuvres could prove more effective in China than in economies where state-owned
ownership has a less prominent place. Last but not least, as the cumulative growth of
manufacturing output contributes to increase the productive capacity of the workforce,
on which the rate of productivity growth depends (Kaldor 1978), it can therefore be
assumed that support for investment in order to tackle the fall in demand due to the
spread of COVID-19 on an international scale can accelerate the potential for output
growth in the long term.
A simple AD-AS scheme can summarize the assumptions outlined above (Figure 7): if
one assumes that the AD1 curve refers to the level of aggregate demand immediately after
the COVID-19 lockdown, increased effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanisms
could permit expansive manoeuvres to rapidly restore AD to its original position (AD0)
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rather than to a hypothetically lower level (ADh). At the same time, if the planning of the
investment prioritizes development in high-tech areas, then the stimuli may shift the
aggregate supply curve (AS0) in the direction of ASh, increasing output while preventing
price increases.
4. The Mitigation of the Impact of COVID-19 on the Chinese Economy
(Phase I)
The economic downturn caused by COVID-19 depends on the capacity of the political
and socioeconomic system to minimize the duration of the slowdown of productive
activities. Once understood the deadly power of the virus, in the second half of January
2020,8 China’s central government clarified how the country’s priority was the eradica-
tion of the virus in the shortest possible time. The prompt imposition of measures
aimed at stopping the productive activities in the areas at the epicentre of the epidemic
and in the surroundings, the temporary closure of non-essential activities in the rest of
the country, and the limitation of the movement of people at inter-regional level—to
the point of isolating the entire highly industrialized region of Hubei—have played a
decisive role in the isolation of the viral outbreaks. Although these measures have
entailed a huge economic cost, they have averted an uncontrolled spread of the epidemic
(WHO 2020), allowing the rapid restoration of the normal functioning of the institutions
which ultimately ensure the reproduction of economic life.
By virtue of their productive capacity, SOEs have contributed to the rapid epilogue of
the emergency phase, not only by developing technologies that have reduced diagnosis
and treatment time, but also by increasing the production of protective equipment
and by building emergency infrastructures in extremely short times. For example, the
Huoshenshan Hospital constructed in Wuhan between January 23 and February2,
Figure 7. The absorption of the demand shock and the expansion of aggregate supply.
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2020 was built by the SOE, China State Construction. Beijing Urban Construction Group
increased the capacity of the Xiaotangshan Hospital in Beijing after receiving direct fund-
ing from the central bank. Other SOEs such as Sinopharm, CHTC Jiahua Nonwoven Co
Ltd, Nanjing Jihua 3521 Special Equipment Co Ltd, Gree Electric Appliances Inc. and
even the oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation have supplied tens of millions
of units of protective and medical equipment. Others, such as China Post Group and
State Grid Corp of China have accelerated delivery and distribution services for medical
equipment and increased the supply of energy charging stations for machinery dedicated
to epidemic prevention (China Daily 2020; CNPC 2020; Fan 2020; Liu 2020; PBC 2020a;
SASAC 2020; Xinhua 2020a; Yu 2020; Zhao 2020a, 2020b; Zheng 2020; Zhong 2020a,
2020b).9
Such effort has been sustained by the banking system. At the end of January, the PBC
transferred about 300 billion yuan (39.5 billion euros) to the nine largest state-owned
banks, which in turn have financed the operations of thousands of businesses involved
in the prevention and control of the epidemic.10 By ensuring the full availability of pro-
tective material, the action of the SOEs has contributed to facilitating the implementation
of the security measures established at the central level, thus preventing the reopening of
the plants being accompanied by a second epidemic wave. For this purpose, resumption
of the activities has been subject to strict discipline by the central government: the local
government have been delegated the supervision of the distribution of the protective
materials in the production units and the responsibility of sending experts to instruct
the workers on their correct use. At the same time, the companies were assigned the
task of monitoring the health of their employees, with complex and costly procedures,
not least from a sanctioning point of view (State Council of the People’s Republic of
China 2020b, 2020c, 2020d).
The public efforts outlined above were quick to show their effects: as early as mid-
March 2020, excluding the Hubei region, 90% of the plants in the country had
resumed their activities (NBS 2020c). To more accurately contextualize the recovery
of operations in China, it may be useful to look at the Purchasing Managers Index
regarding the production of the manufacturing sector. For this index, a representa-
tive sample of firms is consulted on whether production has increased, decreased or
remained stable, in comparison to the previous month. A value above 50 marks an
expansion of production compared to the previous month, while a lower value indi-
cates a contraction. Beyond providing real time output growth information, this
indicator can accurately predict GDP growth over the short term (Dasgupta and
Lahiri 1993).
Figure 8 compares the Purchasing Managers Index of manufacturing industry in
different countries in the first and second month following the outbreak of the epi-
demic in their respective areas.11 The draconian interventions immediately adopted
by China have indeed entailed an almost unparalleled economic cost in the very
short term. However, unlike in advanced economies, already one month after the
beginning of the emergency the Purchasing Managers Index in China has seen a
marked improvement thanks to the rapid reopening of the plants. This is confirmed
by the growth in output, which in March 2020 recorded an increase of 32% over the
previous month.
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The rapid reactivation of the industrial system will not be enough to avoid a drop in
China’s GDP in the first trimester (−6.8%). Nevertheless, forecasts for other countries
appear much darker—in line with the significant deterioration of their respective Pur-
chasing Managers Indexes in April 2020. IHS Markit 2020 estimates that the GDP of
the Eurozone and the United States, after experiencing a severe fall in the first trimester,
will fall by 7.4% and 13% respectively in the second quarter of 2020. According to the
MEF’s (Ministry of Economy and Finance of Italy) Economic and Financial Document,
Italy’s GDP will fall by 10.5%.
Among other things, the purely social (and economic, in terms of inflationary press-
ures) costs involved in the first phase of the emergency in China have also been partially
alleviated by the action of the SOEs, which have played an important role in the price
control. For example, State Grid Corporation of China has guaranteed free energy supply
to households in the city of Wuhan, as well as increasing the offer of free energy charging
stations. Other state-owned enterprises such as China Grain Reserves Group, COFCO
Group and China Resources Group have increased food production, while at the same
time guaranteeing transport and distribution services, and strengthened retailer supervi-
sion to prevent speculation on the cost of food and basic necessities (Zhang 2020b; Zhao
2020c; Zhong and Zheng 2020).
In conclusion, the hypothetical absence of SOEs, combined with the government’s
reduced institutional capacity to implement stringent measures to minimize social con-
tacts, would have amplified the magnitude of the shock caused by the COVID-19 erup-
tion in China. Clearly, the rapid conclusion of the first phase has produced significant
benefits in the subsequent phases, to the extent that more limited stimuli will be needed
to re-establish previous output levels.
5. The Reactivation of the Chinese Production System (Phase II)
While proving successful in minimizing the spread and fatality of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the implementation of the lock-down strategy by Chinese government has
Figure 8. Purchasing Managers Index (50 = no variation from previous month). Source: IHS Markit
(2020).
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nevertheless meant an abrupt interruption in the production and logistics input flows.
This has first and foremost penalized the weakest links in the domestic production
chain.12 For this reason, during the second phase of the coronavirus emergency, the pivo-
tal objective of Chinese government was to alleviate the pressure on SMEs’ cash flow,
supporting their access to credit by easing the PBC monetary policy.
PBC’s approach differs markedly from the one adopted by the the Federal Reserve and
the European Central Bank, which, from the very early stages of the epidemic, flooded the
markets with liquidity through robust securities purchasing plans and the maintenance
of real interest rates in negative territories. On the contrary, the Chinese government’s
action was characterized by a certain caution in terms of the expansion of money supply.
On the other hand, the launch of a quantitative easing in China could have led to a sig-
nificant increase in domestic inflation and de facto unload the financing of the
manoeuvre on fixed income recipients. This is why, at this stage, monetary policy in
China was focused on ensuring that the liquidity placed on the market was actually
used to ensure the survival of SME activities. First, the central bank established that
the real estate market could not be used to stimulate the economy in the short term,
obstructing the flow of credit to finance home trading (Chen and Reeves 2020; Xinhua
2020e). Second, the three largest public banks were urged by the PBC to increase the
supply of credit to SMEs, to the extent that loans to these entities will have to increase
“no less than 30% [in comparison to the first quarter 2019], and interest rates will
have to substantially fall compared to 2019” (PBC 2020h). At the same time, state-
owned banks have been allowed to raise the share of credit to small and medium-sized
enterprises to 350 billion yuan (50 billion euros).
The monetary stimuli that will be examined below have followed the direction out-
lined by the CBIRC, which, as early as the beginning of February 2020, instructed the
banking institutions to extend the period of loan repayments and reduce the fees and
interest applied. To do this, it was also considered that public banks would grant credit
to SMEs with deposit or warehouse receipts as warranty, or that credit would be granted
in advance to finance their orders’ payments. Finally, CBIRC has instructed industrial
SOEs, on the one hand, to pay their suppliers real-time, even before the goods’ delivery
and, on the other hand, to reduce the amount of payments required in advance to
upstream firms in the production chain (CBIRC 2020a, 2020b; Jiang 2020a).
Within this regulatory framework, aimed at alleviating pressure on SMEs’ cash
flow, the PBC has provided credit institutions about 800 billion yuan (€ 116 billion)
at subsidized interest rates (Jiang 2020b).13 While 300 billion flowed to the organiz-
ations involved in the fight against the coronavirus, 500 billion will progressively be
used to finance the reopening of plants, the resumption of production and the pay-
ment of overdue debts of SMEs. At the beginning of April 2020, the government com-
missioned the PBC to increase its refinancing operations by an additional 1000 billion
in order to expand the credit supply for small and medium-sized banks over the course
of the year.
It is worth noting that the PBC has imposed a limit (4.55%) on the interest rate
applied to loans financed from these resources. As the inflation rate in March-April
in China was 5.1%, SMEs benefited from credit at negative real interest rates. In
order to align their credit allocation preferences with the goals set by the government,
it was decided that banks would have access to the additional liquidity provided by the
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PBC if the previously provided resources had actually been used to support SMEs (PBC
2020a, 2020b, 2020c).
In order to strengthen the impact of the interventions on the real economy, the PBC
lowered the required reserve ratio (RRR) for small and medium-sized commercial banks
operating in rural and regional areas. In order to channel the released liquidity to SMEs,
the RRR cut was implemented gradually, so that the PBC could verify that banks were
lending to SMEs at relatively low interest rates before strengthening their lending
capacity by further reducing the RRR (PBC 2020d). At the beginning of April 2020, in
order to maximise the effectiveness of this measure, the PBC reduced by half the interest
rate at which it remunerates the reserves above the mandatory amount and deposited by
the financial institutions at the central bank itself. The intention was to encourage com-
mercial banks to reduce the reserves, set aside for precautionary purposes, by pushing
them “to boost the efficiency of fund use and better serve the real economy” (PBC
2020d). Finally, in order to further expand credit for SMEs, the government supported
the issue of relatively low interest bonds by a limited number of public banks, stipulating
that these resources were to be used solely to support SMEs (Jiang 2020b).
The joint action of CBIRC, PBC and public banks has made it possible to effectively
transmit the monetary stimuli to the real economy. In the first three months of 2020, the
banking system diverted 7.25 trillion yuan to the real sector of the economy (+12.7%
year-on-year). This accounts for more than 65% of the aggregate financing to the real
economy (AFRE) (PBC 2020k), with the latter growing by 2486 billion yuan over the pre-
vious year (Figure 9). The largest beneficiaries of the credit expansion have been public
institutions and enterprises, which have received 85.1% of the loans granted by financial
institutions (PBC 2020j; Xinhua 2020b).
On the whole, the monetary policy measures examined above have been a decisive
impulse to reboot the production machine (Jiang 2020c; PBC 2020f, 2020g; Xinhua
2020b), to the extent that at the end of April 2020 “industrial production is essentially
recovered” (PBC 2020i).
Figure 9. Total funding to the economy in the first quarter of the year (2012–2020). Source: PBC
(2020j, 2020k), Xinhua (2020b).
16 F. MACHEDA
6. State Investment as the Cornerstone of the Countercyclical Strategy
(Phase III)
From mid-March 2020, it became clear that preservation of production capacity could
not in itself be sufficient to bring output back up to pre-COVID-19 levels. The global
spread of the epidemic has resulted in the most severe fall in foreign orders since
2008, increasing the private agents’ reluctance in the manufacturing sector to increase
decisively their investment despite, as we shall see below, the PBC’s pursuit of a more
accommodating monetary policy. After all, this phenomenon is already evident in the
April 2020 figures, when the rebound in industrial production have tended to be
accompanied by a protracted decline in investment. By directly and indirectly involving
at least 110 million Chinese, the downsizing of the manufacturing sector would lead to a
stagnation of GDP and a worrying expansion of unemployment.
For the first time in decades, the Chinese government has not set any growth targets
for the current year due to the serious relative uncertainty in world economy. However, it
can be deduced by reflecting on the employment target set during the two annual plenary
sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Con-
sultative Conference (CPPCC), held in late May 2020. It has been set at 9 million new
jobs in urban areas, in order to keep the unemployment rate close to 6%.14 Since each
point of loss in growth is associated with an increase of almost 4 million unemployed,15
a protraction of the decline in the output at a rate similar to that of the first quarter of
2020 would mean a swelling of the “sack” of unemployment—with all the socio-political
stability problems that this entails. On the contrary, the achievement of the employment
targets estimated above is bound to an annual GDP growth of about 4%.
The achievement of this goal has required the implementation of a series of fiscal and
monetary stimuli. Together with the reduction of social security payments by firms,16 the
countercyclical action undertaken by the Chinese government since the end of March
2020 has been centred around an extensive infrastructure investment program—financed
mainly by the issue of bonds on behalf of the local governments amounting to 3750 bil-
lion yuan (1600 more than in 2019)—both in traditional and more modern areas
(Table 1). Concerning the former, the public sector has undertaken the support of
regional development projects. As for the latter, highly innovative projects will be
funded. Furthermore, resources will be increased to encourage the transition to “smart
Table 1. Composition of public investment stimuli in China by sector.
Investments in “traditional”
areas Investments in “innovative” areas Investments in health care
3,750 billion yuan (3.8% GDP) 1,000 billion yuan (1% GDP)
. transportation facilities;
. water conservancy works;






. ultra-high voltage direct current;
. charging facilities to promote wider
use of new energy vehicles;
. applications new technologies to
traditional infrastructures;
. vaccine research and fast testing
technology development:
. medical facilities for epidemic
prevention and treatment;
. establishment national laboratories and
hospitals;
. strengthening community-level health
and epidemic prevention efforts;
Source: PBC (2020e), Chen (2020a, 2020b), Zhang (2020a), Xinhua (2020c, 2020d, 2020f), NDRC (2020), Zhao and Zhang (2020).
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cities.” Finally, 1000 billion yuan (128 billion euros), financed by the issuance of “special
government bonds,” will be invested to accelerate research and development in the bio-
technology sector, to improve the mechanisms of prevention of infectious diseases and to
strengthen health infrastructures such as laboratories and hospitals.
Support for demand for capital goods has been accompanied by a gradual relaxation of
the monetary policy. The marked growth of the M2 aggregate since April (+11.1%, com-
pared to an average of 8.7% in 2019) seems set to accelerate over the course of the year, if
it is true that, in the report presented during the “two plenary sessions”mentioned above,
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang announced that
the country will use a variety of tools . . . to enable M2money supply and aggregate financing
to grow at notably higher rates than last year. . . . It is crucial to take steps to ensure enter-
prises can secure loans more easily, and promote steady reduction of interest rates. (Xinhua
2020g)
Understandably, it is premature to venture an assessment of the effectiveness of the
stimuli launched by the Chinese government during the first months of 2020. Neverthe-
less, an investigation of the mechanisms that allowed the expansionary manoeuvres
adopted by the Chinese government in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis to translate
into the impressive GDP growth of17 2009–2010 might allow some hypothesis to be
made in this respect. Then as today, international trade was hit by a severe recession
that strongly impacted the export sector, as a result of which many “factories closed see-
mingly overnight, and workers were laid off” (Wong 2011, 3). The substantial weight of
exports on China’s economy at the time exerted a strong downward pressure on its GDP,
convincing the political decision-makers “to do everything necessary to reverse the
trend” (Wong 2011, 5). This because the legitimacy of the government was, then as
today, bound twice to maintaining high growth rates and expanding employment oppor-
tunities, especially in the urban sector.
In order to continue on the path of modernization, Chinese government took
“measures to shift the emphasis in its economic activity from foreign expansion to dom-
estic development, mostly to creating new infrastructure” (Rapoport and Gerts 2010, 60).
“State-owned enterprises have been the primary vehicle through which Chinese govern-
ment implemented the large stimulus package of 2008 and 2009” (Chen, Li, and Tillmann
2019, 27). This for two reasons: firstly, thanks to their ability to invest in accordance with
socio-political objectives set by the government rather than pursuing the maximization
of equity values (He and Kyaw 2018); and secondly, thanks to their ability to operate even
with very low profits if not even at a loss (Yu 2014, 177).
On the monetary side, the sharp credit expansion which started in the last quarter of
2008 (Chan and Zhu 2009, 20–21) has supported the investment efforts of the state-
owned enterprises. Government interference in their operations and the preferential
access to credit because of their privileged relationship with the banking system, also
dominated by SOEs, have increased the leverage of industrial SOEs compared to private
firms in the same sector, which indeed continued their “deleveraging” at least until 2016
(Figure 10).
This divergence reflects the asymmetric response between investment decisions taken
by public and private firms. While the slowdown in foreign demand from advanced
countries, followed by the fall in profitability of the industrial sector (see Figure 3),
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depressed the expectations of export-oriented private companies—which predictably
responded by decelerating their investment rate—SOEs acted in the opposite direction,
increasing their investments in key areas such as agriculture, energy and transport (Deng
et al. 2011; Wen and Wu 2014). The financial and industrial activism of state-owned
enterprises during last decade’s crisis has provided a decisive impulse in support of infra-
structure investments and thus to economic recovery.
Of course, the adoption of the stimulus package by the Chinese Government in spring
2020 does not guarantee that the same results will be achieved. For one, the fiscal support
to public investments is considerably lower, i.e. about 5% of GDP compared to 12% in
2008 and 2009—even if it has to be acknowledged that the contribution from net exports
to GDP growth (and thus the necessary countercyclical action) has declined significantly
in recent years compared to the pre-2009 period (Zhang 2020a). Second, Chinese econ-
omy itself has entered a “new normal” phase, characterized by an average growth rate of
about 7% over the last five years against the double-digit growth rates of the previous
period.18
Yet, the significant position that SOEs still occupy in the national economy might
ensure that the reproposal of expansive manoeuvres is followed by a prompt recovery
of aggregate demand even in the current context. This is even more true if we consider
two aspects. On the one hand, the current weight of state-owned enterprises in the econ-
omy has remained virtually unchanged over the past ten years, mainly due to the fiscal
stimulus and the asymmetric effects resulting from the easing of credit conditions follow-
ing the 2009 crisis. As Figure 11 shows, after almost a decade of continuous regression,
and after slowing its pace from 2007 to 2012, the share of publicly-owned capital stock in
the industrial sector actually increased from the following year, returning to close to 50%,
signalling an aggressive “strike back” of the state from 2013 to this date (Lardy 2019).
This implies that the monetary expansion recently planned by public decision-makers
may once again be able of “pushing on a string,” i.e. projecting the economic system
Figure 10. Leverage of public and private industrial enterprises in China. Source: NBS (National Bureau
of Statistics of China) (2020a, 2020b, 2020c). Note: Leverage = total liabilities/total assets.
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in the direction of expansion by virtue of the relationship that continues to strengthen the
banking and industrial systems.
On the other hand, the increase in SOE debt levels resulting from monetary expansion
does not appear to pose a threat to the preservation of the internal balance of Chinese
economy. In fact, although their short-term returns might be negative, the aim of public
infrastructure projects is to increase productive efficiency, capital intensity and total fac-
tor productivity. This goal is confirmed not only by the type of investment recently
favoured by the Chinese government, but also by a measure adopted at the beginning
of March 2020, which established that SOEs should increase the employment opportu-
nities for new graduates (Cheng 2020; Zhong 2020c), in order that the most modern
part of the country’s human capital can actively contribute to accelerating the innovative
skills of state-owned enterprises.
The increase of the potential of output growth over the long term intrinsic to this strat-
egy could indeed lead to an increase in the flow of resources through which to pay inter-
est and repay debts—avoiding that the expansion of SOE’s production capacity is
reflected in substantial losses for the banking system and, potentially, in an unsustainable
growth of public debt. This is precisely what happened in the aftermath of the 2008
stimulus plan, where the cumulative growth in manufacturing output ensured by the
expansion of public investment, especially in the most innovative sectors (Qi and Kotz
2020), has contributed to increase the productivity growth rate. In this regard, it must
be noted that the bulk of China’s R&D investments in the industrial sector were carried
out by large enterprises owned or controlled by the state, which then generated more
innovation output than private firms during the years following the financial crisis of
2008 (Kroll and Kou 2019, 191). The upward trend in profitability has therefore allowed
state-owned enterprises to significantly reduce their debt rates—returning to 2007 levels
and converging towards those of private enterprises (Figure 10).
Moreover, the preservation of relatively low levels of public debt over the last decade
(50.1% of GDP in 2019)19 and the risible share of it held by foreign investors (8.5% of the
Figure 11. Share of state and private-owned industrial capital stock on the total in China. Source: NBS
(2020a, 2020b, 2020c).
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total) could pave the way for a possible strengthening of fiscal stimulus by the Chinese
government in the second half of 2020—should the internal and external economic scen-
ario not show tangible signs of recovery.
7. Conclusions
The crisis caused by the COVID-19 eruption shows how the allocative efficiency of the
private sector can rapidly turn into social macro-inefficiency. Looking only at the period
immediately following the outbreak of the epidemic, the efficient functioning of market
mechanisms requires that the increase in orders from the public sector for medical equip-
ment and equipment (ventilators, masks, etc.) must exert a price increase such as to
ensure a level of profitability sufficient to offset the risks inherent in the new investments,
or cover the costs of productive conversion of firms active in other sectors. Only then can
we expect an expansion of production on the part of the private sector. However, there is
no assurance that this will happen, let alone that the increase in supply will meet the care
needs of the population.
If one assumes that, in the sectors involved in the production of the goods needed to
contain the spread of the epidemic the supply curve remains unchanged, the price level
set by the state must be higher than that prevailing on the market in order for the private
sector to spontaneously use additional productive factors to increase output. In other
terms, the pursuit of the objective of maximization of profitability at the level of an indi-
vidual company can lead to a significant fiscal cost for the state, which would inevitably
weigh heavily on other sectors of an already generally debilitated economy. If such fiscal
cost proves to be unsustainable, then the pursuit of business profitability would lead to
sub-optimal levels of investment from a social point of view.
Moreover, even if the private agents were to consider the expected returns sufficient to
justify the investment, the time span between planning, implementation and activation of
production capacity may prove to be so long as to render the production capacity expan-
sion almost unnecessary. It is possible to reach the paradoxical situation of finishing the
construction of specialized facilities for the treatment of viral pneumonia after the epi-
demic has been eradicated. For these reasons, as Dani Rodrik rightly emphasises,
“there is nothing like a pandemic to highlight markets’ inadequacy in the face of collec-
tive-action problems and the importance of state capacity to respond to crises and protect
people” (Rodrik 2020).
In fact, it is precisely in times of crisis such as the present one where the “inefficiency” of
the public sector translates into social macro-efficiency. It is no coincidence that one of the
most effective countries in minimizing losses both in terms of human lives and in econ-
omic terms—and which seems destined to avoid recession—is China, where the state sec-
tor occupies the key centres of economic life. In this work, we have attempted to show how
the Chinese government’s ability tomobilize the resources needed to promptly combat the
COVID-19 epidemic is rooted in the country’s development model—a model revolving
around state-owned enterprises, both in the industrial and banking sectors.
By virtue of its de facto monopolistic power over the banking sector, the government
has been and still is capable of suppressing financial rents and at the same time channel
resources to strategically important sectors. This is especially true in the case of industrial
SOEs, which despite their poor profitability, have contributed to raising employment
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levels above those compatible with their “survival” in a pure market system. The maxi-
misation of the use of production factors regardless of their profitability, or at any rate
only to the extent to cover the costs, thereby allows increasing the level of the equilibrium
output. This can only be considered “irrational” (and inefficient) from a purely capitalis-
tic point of view, but from a social point of view, the maximization of the use of pro-
ductive resources can only be considered “rational” (and efficient). This is the
structural feature that has made Chinese economy better equipped to deal with the cur-
rent crisis—because it is precisely at critical times that the need to maximize output
clearly emerges, in spite of guaranteed returns on investment or the possibility to remu-
nerate savers in an “adequate” way.
Furthermore, the strong presence of the state in the credit system gives political
decision-makers the power to mobilize resources not only towards industries considered
key to economic development (such as heavy industry) but also to divert them quickly to
those sectors best equipped to fight the epidemic (like healthcare)—as occurred during
the first phase—or towards small and medium enterprises, thus ensuring the operativity
of China’s economic key sector, i.e. manufacturing, as witnessed during the second phase
of the fight against the coronavirus. In this sense, the governmental activism in Chinese
banking results in monetary policies which, besides transcending objectives confined to
mere price stability, are capable of rapidly changing the direction of credit flows in
accordance with targets set at the central level. This is crucial, not only in combating
the epidemic, but also in preventing recession.
As virtuous as it is in countering emergencies, China’s economic structure today is not
exempt of criticalities. To start, even if government interventions targeted at lowering
interest rates show some effectiveness in reviving the economy in moments of crisis, an
excessive use of this power stemming from the monopoly on credit could discourage
the accumulation of national savings on the long term. Particularly as the possible
strengthening of the public pension systems, made necessary by the aging of the popu-
lation, will weaken the tendency to store a high share of savings for precautionary reasons.
Lastly, it should not be underestimated that the desire to preserve, for purely political
reasons, full employmentwithin a particularly severe depressive context, could lead the gov-
ernment to an excessive intervention that would go far beyond “the mere attempt to com-
pensate for the insufficient level of aggregate demand in the short-run” (Baran 1980, 92).
This could push the state sector to “invade” other fields, for instance those related to light
industry. Whilst such intrusion may be justified when investments are lacking because the
prospects for profit are not attractive enough for private agents, it might become a deterrent
to their initiative once the economy is backonapathof growth.The resulting “deterioration”
of the “competitive climate” could thusdeprive theChinese economyof the dynamismof the
business sector exposed to international competition,whichhas beenoneof the key variables
of China’s extraordinary growth over the last forty years.
Notes
1. The spread of the epidemic in the USA, in Italy, in France and in Great Britain could also
affect the production capacity of the Chinese manufacturing industry, being these countries
the major suppliers of high-tech products, components and engines, turbines, agricultural
products and industrial raw materials.
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2. Data on exports was obtained from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s
Republic of China.
3. As Keynes envisioned, it is not the ownership of the instruments of production which it is
important for the State to assume. If the State is able to determine the aggregate amount of
resources devoted to augmenting the instruments and the basic rate of reward to those who
own them, it will have accomplished all that is necessary (Keynes 1936, 378). This contains
the idea that the capitalist state, by controlling the levers that contribute to determine the
real wage (such as the possibility to implement income policies and/or to adopt expansive
monetary measures) “is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on
long views” (Keynes 1936, 164). In this sense, the main goal of state intervention in capitalist
countries is the improvement of profitability expectations, which will induce private firms to
increase their investments.
4. Between 1979 and 2017, the share of investment in China’s GDP was 15 points above the
world average.
5. Yet in 2012, one in four SOEs operated at a loss (Yu 2014, 177).
6. Data relating to the composition of the activities of banking institutions in China are
obtained from the website of the Chinese Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission.
See (CBIRC 2014).
7. The development of the capital market in China has not eroded the government’s power to
demand that SOEs fulfill their “duties,” as their IPO requests are scrutinized by the political
power, and their approval is linked more to the pursuit of growth strategies centred on full
employment rather than on profit maximization (Johansson et al. 2017; Li and Zhou 2015).
8. In the early stages of the epidemic, the Wuhan government denied the possibility of infec-
tion between humans. For this reason, local representatives of the Communist Party were
removed from their positions.
9. On the role of SOEs in the fight against the virus, see http://en.sasac.gov.cn/
TimelineSOEsfightagainstCOVID19.html.
10. From the January 25 to the March 10, 2020, the SOEs benefiting from the first tranche of
credits produced 1.6 billion masks, 87.79 million protective suits, 4.21 million protective
goggles, 10.29 million test kits, 4143 pressurized ambulances, 2.49 million tons of vegetables,
3.74 million tons of wheat and 1.56 million tons of meat (PBC 2020a, 2020b).
11. Since COVID-19 hit China about a month earlier, February and March of 2020 have been
selected for this country, while for all the other countries are considered the months of
March and April.
12. A study conducted by CEIBS in February 2020 quoted by Huang et al. (2020) reported that
85% of the 995 SMEs under investigation would not survive for more than three months.
13. Liquidity was injected through rediscount operations and exceptional loans—the latter
being the main means by which the PBC broadened the monetary base during the planning
era.
14. See, http://english.court.gov.cn/2020-05/22/content_37536163.htm.
15. The estimate is by Renmin University’s Vice President, Liu Yuanchun (Economic Daily
2020).
16. This measure, which costs 2500 billion yuan, is designed to help labour-intensive SMEs,
where social security contributions account for about 30%–40% of labour costs.
17. In 2009 and 2010, China’s average GDP growth was 10%, compared with a world average of
1.3%.
18. This new phase can be associated with the transition from an export-oriented growth model
—based on the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves aimed at compressing the
exchange rate—to a progressively domestic consumption-oriented one.
19. Although there are no official figures, a study published by BNP Paribas Asset Management
with the self-explanatory title “Demystifying China’s local government debt” estimates that
China’s total public debt is between 51% and 76%, concluding that “China’s total (central +
local government) public debt-to-GDP ratio is not excessive compared to many other
countries” (Lo 2019).
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